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Abstract—A smart grid system can be considered as a multi-
layered network with power network in one layer and 
communication network in the other. The entities in both the 
layers exhibit complex intra-and-interdependencies between 
them. A reliable decision making by the smart grid operator is 
contingent upon correct analysis of such dependencies between 
its entities and also on accurate identification of the most critical 
entities in the system.  The Modified Implicative 
Interdependency Model (MIIM) [1] successfully captures such 
dependencies using multi-valued Boolean Logic based equations 
called Interdependency Relations (IDRs) after most of the 
existing models made failed attempts in doing that. In this 
paper, for any given integer K, this model is used to identify the 
K-most vulnerable entities in a smart grid, failure of which can 
maximize the network damage. Owing to the problem being NP 
complete, an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) based solution 
is given here. Validation of the model [1] and the results of the 
ILP based solution is done by simulating a smart grid system of 
IEEE 14-Bus using MATPOWER and Java Network Simulator 
(JNS). Simulation results prove that not only the model MIIM 
[1] is correct but also it can predict the network damage for 
failure of K-most vulnerable entities more accurately than its 
predecessor Implicative Interdependency Model (IIM) [2]. 
Keywords—smart grid, cascading failure, vulnerable entities, 
interdependency relations, joint network, MIIM model. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The smart grid system can be modelled as a joint power-
communication network where the entities of both the 
network are structurally and functionally dependent on each 
other. The entities of communication network get power 
supplies from the power network entities and they in turn take 
the responsibility of monitoring the power network entities by 
continuously sending SCADA and PMU data from each of the 
substations to the control centers in a secure and efficient 
manner. As a result, entities of both power and 
communication network exhibit complex intra-and-
interdependencies between them where the failure of one or 
more entities can lead to subsequent failure of multiple other 
entities leading to a catastrophe. In order to avoid such a 
condition, the researchers should have a clear understanding 
of such complex dependencies between the entities and based 
on that they should be able to identify the most critical entities 
in the smart grid system, failure of which can maximize the 
network damage. 
Efficient hardening techniques [3] followed for such 
critical entities can save the smart grid from a huge damage. 
Yet, in order to identify the most vulnerable entities in the 
system, clear understanding of the design of the joint power-
communication system as well as an appropriate 
interdependency model to capture the complex dependencies 
in a smart grid are necessary. Therefore, several attempts are 
made by the researchers to identify those dependencies and 
reflect them in a graph-based models [4], [5], yet most of them 
lack physical realism. A simple and easy Boolean Logic based 
dependency model, termed as the Implicative 
Interdependency Model (IIM) is proposed in [2], that 
accurately captures the complex interdependencies between 
the entities in a critical infrastructure. However, this model 
ignores the effect of failure of communication network entities 
and does not provide a clear picture of the communication 
network design in a smart grid system. Moreover, the IIM 
model has a binary nature. Entities in that model can either 
remain operational or become non-operational, but there is no 
concept of reduced operability which is a very common 
feature of the smart grid entities. In [6], a rough idea about the 
communication network for smart grid is provided but it also 
lacks the detailed description of the design of communication 
infrastructure. A Modified Implicative Interdependency 
Model (MIIM) proposed in [1] takes into account all such 
drawbacks and provides a clear picture of the smart grid 
network design by taking inputs from a utility in the U.S. 
Southwest. It also considers different operational levels of the 
entities and model the complex dependencies using multi-
valued Boolean Logic based equations called Interdependency 
Relations (IDRs) where the entities in the joint network are 
considered as Boolean variables, values of which can change 
between 0 indicating no-operation, 1 indicating reduced 
operation and 2 indicating full operation. Just by solving these 
IDRs the operators can identify the operational states of 
different entities in the network after some initial failure has 
taken place in the system and thereby recognize the most 
vulnerable entities in the network. 
Even after identifying all the vulnerable entities in the 
system, the smart grid operator can have a budget constraint 
of hardening only K entities of the network, where K can be 
any integer. In that case, it is important to identify the K-most 
critical entities in the system. The problem of identifying the 
K-most vulnerable entities in a joint power-communication 
network is already proved to be NP complete in [2]. Therefore, 
an Integer Linear Programming based solution for the problem 
is given in this paper using the MIIM IDRs. Finally, a 
validation of the results obtained from the proposed method is 
done by co-simulating the two layers of the smart grid network 
of IEEE 14-Bus system using MATPOWER and Java 
Network Simulator (JNS) and the simulation results are 
compared with that obtained using ILP solutions of both 
MIIM [1] and IIM [2] IDRs to show that the modified version 
of IIM is more realistic. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II 
gives an overview of the IIM and MIIM models. Problem 
definition of the self-updating K-contingency list is given in 
Section III and an ILP based solution to the problem is 
proposed in Section IV of the paper. A comparative analysis 
between the K-contingency lists obtained using MIIM, IIM 
and smart grid network layers co-simulation is provided in 
Section V. Section VI concludes the paper. 
II. OVERVIEW OF IIM AND MIIM 
In both IIM [2] and MIIM [1], the smart grid system can 
be viewed as a multilayer network, represented as a set 
𝐽(𝐸, 𝐹(𝐸)) , where 𝐸 = 𝑃 ∪ 𝐶 ∪ 𝐶𝑃  which means all entities 
belonging to power layer, communication layer and the 
intermediate layer joining power and communication entities; 
and F(E) represents the set of IDRs. The entities in power 
layer (layer 1) are considered as P type entities where 𝑃 =
{𝑃1, 𝑃2, … 𝑃𝑛} and entities in ICT layer (layer 2) are named as 
C type entities where 𝐶 = {𝐶1, 𝐶2, … 𝐶𝑚}. The set F(E) is used 
in both the models to capture the dependencies among 
interacting entities in the network. Yet, only structural 
dependencies are considered to generate the IDRs in IIM and 
both structural as well as operational aspects of the entities are 
taken into account while formulating IDRs for MIIM. IIM has 
a binary nature and the entities in that model can either be 
operational with a state value of 0 or be non-operational with 
a state value of 1. The most common feature of reduced 
operability in critical infrastructures is ignored in IIM. The 
entities in MIIM can take a value of 0, 1 and 2 indicating no-
operation, reduced operation and full operation respectively. 
Let 𝐶𝑖, an entity of layer 2, be operational if  (i) 𝐶𝑗 which 
is another entity of layer 2 and 𝑃𝑎 which is an entity of layer 
1, are operational, or (ii) 𝐶𝑘 which is an entity of layer 2 and 
𝑃𝑏  which is an entity of layer 1 are operational, and (iii) 𝐶𝑙 
which is an entity in layer 2 is operational. Then the 
corresponding IIM IDR for 𝐶𝑖 would be: 𝐶𝑖 ← ((𝐶𝑗  . 𝑃𝑎) +
(𝐶𝑘 . 𝑃𝑏)) . 𝐶𝑙. In this IDR, ‘.’ denotes logical AND operation 
and ‘+’ denotes logical OR operation. Similarly, the IDR for 
a P type entity can be expressed.  
In MIIM, three Boolean operators are used while 
formulating the IDRs. The first operator is min-AND, denoted 
by ‘○’, which selects the lowest of its input values. The second 
operator is max-OR, denoted by ‘●’, which selects the highest 
of its input values. The third operator is new_XOR, which is 
denoted by ‘◉’.  If all the inputs of new_XOR are same, then 
the output is also same as the inputs. In all other cases the 
output is 1. This new_XOR operator actually denotes the level 
of operation of an entity. The truth table for all the 3 new 
operators are given in Table I.  
TABLE I.  TRUTH TABLE FOR MIIM OPERATORS 
Input 1 Input 2 min-AND max-OR new_XOR 
2 2 2 2 2 
2 1 1 2 1 
2 0 0 2 1 
1 2 1 2 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 1 1 
0 2 0 2 1 
0 1 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 
 
In order to illustrate MIIM, let us assume that if an entity 
in condition  (i) or (ii) fails,  𝐶𝑖 will still work full operability, 
but if (iii) is not satisfied then 𝐶𝑖  will operate at a reduced 
level; this relation can be expressed using MIIM IDRs as: 
𝐶𝑖 ← ((𝐶𝑗  ○  𝑃𝑎) ● (𝐶𝑘  ○  𝑃𝑏)) ◉ 𝐶𝑙. To differentiate 
between the two models in terms of smart grid system 
application, the failure of entity 𝐶𝑙 for the above IIM and 
MIIM IDRs are considered and the outcomes are observed in 
Table II.  
TABLE II.  OPERATIONAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IIM AND MIIM 
 IIM MIIM 
STEP 1 𝐶𝑙 → 0 𝐶𝑙 → 0 
STEP 2 
𝐶𝑖
⟵ (((2 .2)
+ (2.2)) . 0) 
𝐶𝑖
⟵ (((2 ○ 2)●(2
○ 2))◉0) 
STEP 3 𝐶𝑖 ⟵ ((2 + 2) . 0) 𝐶𝑖 ⟵ ((2●2)◉0) 
STEP 4 𝐶𝑖 ⟵ (2 . 0) 𝐶𝑖 ⟵ (2◉0) 
STEP 5 𝐶𝑖 ⟵ 0 𝐶𝑖 ⟵ 1 
 
It is observed in Table II, that for same kind of 
dependencies, failure of the entity 𝐶𝑙  results in the failure of 
entity  𝐶𝑖 in case of IIM but it only reduces the operation level 
in case of MIIM. 
III. K-MOST VULNERABLE ENTITIES (KVE) PROBLEM 
It is important for the operator of a smart grid to identify 
the most vulnerable entities in the network, even before any 
kind of failure or damage takes place in the system. An 
automated system offering identification of KVE in the steady 
state of a smart grid will help the operator to decide which of 
the entities in the system should be hardened [3], so that in any 
case the maximum damage in the smart grid can be avoided. 
When one or more entities fail in the smart grid system, many 
other entities fail as a result and this is called cascading 
failures, and this often might lead to a catastrophe if not 
arrested in time. This cascade stops when the system reaches 
a steady state once again. Given an integer K and a power-
communication network at a steady state, this problem returns 
the set of K-most critical entities in the joint network, failure 
of which can lead to the maximum total number of failed 
entities in the system at the end of the cascade propagation. It 
is to be noted that a cascade can only propagate in one 
direction since an already failed entity cannot be affected 
again by the cascading failure. Therefore, upper bound of the 
cascade is |𝐸𝐺| − 1; where EG is the total number of edges in 
the network. A formal definition of the KVE problem using 
the MIIM [1] model is as follows: 
A. Inputs to the Problem 
•  (a) A joint network 𝐽(𝐸, 𝐹(𝐸)); where 𝐸 = 𝑃 ∪ 𝐶 ∪
𝐶𝑃 
o 𝑃 = 𝐵 ∪ 𝑇 ∪ 𝐵𝑎𝑡𝑡 (Buses, Transmission 
Lines/Transformers, Batteries) 
o 𝐶 = 𝑆𝐸 ∪ 𝑆𝑅𝐸 ∪ 𝐷𝑅𝐸 (Substation 
Entities, SONET-Ring Entities, DWDM-
Ring Entities)  
o 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐿 ∪ 𝑅 ∪ 𝑈 (Power supply lines, 
RTUs and PMUs) 
• (b) Two positive integers K and S 
B. Decision version of the Problem 
Does there exist a set of K entities in E whose failure at 
time t would result in a failure of at least S entities in total at 
the end of the cascading process? 
C. Optimization version of the Problem 
Compute the set of K entities in the joint network 
𝐽(𝐸, 𝐹(𝐸)) whose failure at time t would maximize the 
number of entities failed or in other words minimize the 
overall system state values at the steady state of cascade 
propagation. 
However, the problem of finding K-most vulnerable 
entities is NP complete which is already proved in [2]. 
Therefore, an ILP based solution for the problem is given in 
section 5 of this paper. Also, validation of the results should 
be done by comparing the ILP based solution results with the 
simulation results. 
IV. INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAMMING BASED SOLUTION 
In this section, an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) 
based solution for the KVE problem stated in section 4 of this 
paper is given. The variable list for the problem is given 
below─ 
A. Variable List 
For each entity 𝑒𝑖 ∈ 𝐸 a variable set 𝑥𝑖,𝑡∀𝑡, 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ |𝐸| −
1 is created. The value of 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is 2 if it is fully operational, 1 if 
it is operating at a reduced level of operation and 0 if it is non-
operational. 
B. Objective function 
The objective function for the problem can be defined as:  
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑ 𝑥𝑖,|𝐸|−1
|𝐸|
𝑖=1  
This implies that, the problem aims at minimizing the 
system states for all the entities in the smart gird. 
C. Constraint Set 
1) Constraint set 1: ∑ 𝑥𝑖,0 = 𝐾
|𝐸|
𝑖=1 , entities failed at time 
step 0 is K. 
2)  Constraint set 2: 𝑥𝑖,𝑑 ≤ 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1, ∀𝑡, 1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ |𝐸| − 1. 
This implies that, an entity can only have a system state value 
at a time 𝑡 > 𝑑 , less than or equal to the system state value it 
had at time d. 
3) Constraint set 3: Based on the 3 new Boolean 
operations adopted by MIIM, IDRs can have the following 
format:𝑒𝑎 ← (𝑒𝑏◉𝑒𝑐) ○ (𝑒𝑚●𝑒𝑛). 
a) Step 1: Firstly, the above IDR can be reformed as: 
𝑒𝑎 ← 𝑧𝑏𝑐𝑚𝑛  where the new variable 𝑧𝑏𝑐𝑚𝑛  can be expressed 
as: 𝑧𝑏𝑐𝑚𝑛 ← (𝑔𝑏𝑐) ○ (ℎ𝑚𝑛) where the two new variables 𝑔𝑏𝑐 
and ℎ𝑚𝑛 can be further represented as: 𝑔𝑏𝑐 ← 𝑒𝑏◉𝑒𝑐 and 
ℎ𝑚𝑛 ← 𝑒𝑚●𝑒𝑛. 
b) Step 2: Now, a linear constraint is developed for the 
z type variable (associated with min_AND operator). In order 
to evaluate the IDR: 𝑧𝑏𝑐𝑚𝑛 ← (𝑔𝑏𝑐) ○ (ℎ𝑚𝑛) , 𝑧𝑏𝑐𝑚𝑛  can be 
represented as: 𝑧𝑏𝑐𝑚𝑛 ≤ 𝑔𝑏𝑐,𝑡−1 and 𝑧𝑏𝑐𝑚𝑛 ≤
ℎ𝑚𝑛,𝑡−1, ∀𝑡, 1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ |𝐸| − 1.  
 
c) Step 3: A linear constraint is also developed for the 
h type variable (associated with max_OR operator). In order 
to evaluate the IDR: ℎ𝑚𝑛 ← 𝑒𝑚●𝑒𝑛, ℎ𝑝𝑞 can be represented 
as: ℎ𝑚𝑛 ≥ 𝑥𝑚,𝑡−1 and ℎ𝑚𝑛 ≥ 𝑥𝑛,𝑡−1, ∀𝑡, 1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ |𝐸| − 1.  
d) Step 4: For the g type variable, associated with the 
new_XOR operator, the following linear constraint is 
developed. The IDR: 𝑔𝑏𝑐 ← 𝑒𝑏◉𝑒𝑐 is represented by the 
following set of linear equations: 𝑔𝑏𝑐 ≥ 0, 𝑔𝑏𝑐 ≤
𝑚𝑎𝑥 _𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒, where max_state denotes the state value at the 
highest level of operability for an entity ( 2 in this case), and 
𝑁 × 𝑔𝑏𝑐 ≤ 𝑥𝑏,𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑐,𝑡−1, ∀𝑡, 1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ |𝐸| − 1. Here N is 
the number of operands on which the new_XOR operator 
operates. 
V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN IIM, MIIM AND 
SIMULATION RESULTS 
In order to simulate the smart grid system with IEEE-14 
Bus as the power network and a synthetic yet realistic 
communication network designed as per the principles 
proposed in [1], two different simulation platforms are 
selected. MATPOWER is selected for the simulation of the 
power layer whereas Java Network Simulator (JNS) is 
selected for the simulation of the communication layer. An 
event-driven synchronization [7] between these two kinds of 
simulation platforms is followed, in which whenever an entity 
in the power network fails at time 𝑡 = 𝑡′, not only the power 
entities associated with that entity are updated but also all the 
communication entities receiving power from only that entity 
are removed before the starting of the next round of simulation 
at 𝑡 = (𝑡′ + 1). When a communication entity fails, it does 
not have any immediate effect on the power layer therefore 
only communication network is updated but eventually it will 
lead to unobservability of parts of the power layer even if does 
not lead to direct failure of other entities. However, this case 
is not considered in the simulation as it is assumed that by that 
time, either that communication entity will be replaced or 
repaired. 
Identification of the K-most vulnerable entities using this 
setup is done by failing K-entities in the network at a time and 
observing the corresponding number of failed entities. Since, 
this process is repeated for all different combinations of K-
entities in the network to verify the results obtained from the 
ILP solutions using MIIM [1] and IIM [2] IDRs, a small smart 
grid system of only 14-Buses is considered here.   
Fig. 1. Maximum total entities damaged vs. K value 
 
 Fig. 2. Power Entities (P) and Substation Entities (SE) of a smart grid of IEEE 14-Bus system 
 
 
Fig. 3. SONET-Ring Entities (SRE) 
 
Fig. 4. DWDM-Ring Entities (DRE) 
In fig.1., the maximum damage to the network after the 
failing of K-most vulnerable entities are predicted by the ILP 
based solution to the problem using MIIM IDRs and IIM 
IDRs. The predicted damages are compared with the 
simulated results for a smart grid system of IEEE-14Bus.  
In the smart grid of IEEE 14-Bus system, there are 14 
buses and 34 communication terminals like servers, gateways, 
SADMs and OADMs. It is considered that the transmission 
lines and communication channels can fail when the entities 
at the two ends of it also fail. Therefore, IDRs of those entities 
are considered. They can either have a state value 1 indicating 
they are operational or 0 denoting they have failed. However, 
the other 48 entities (14 P type and 34 C type) may depend on 
these transmission lines or communication channels and thus 
they are included in the IDRs of those 48 entities. Therefore, 
while finding the K-most vulnerable entities, only 48 entities 
are taken into account, but those 48 entities also cover the 
other entities which belong to categories like transmission 
lines or communication links. 
In fig.2., fig.3. and fig.4. the power entities and substation 
entities of communication network, the SONET-Ring entities 
(SRE) and the DWDM-Ring entities (DRE) are shown 
respectively. The nomenclature followed in the figures is 
same as in [1]. 
It is observed that for 𝐾 = 1, the maximum damage in the 
network predicted by MIIM IDRs is 5 out of total 48 entities 
in the smart grid. According the ILP based solution using 
MIIM IDRs, the most vulnerable entity in the network is Bus 
7 denoted as 𝑃7. Failure of 𝑃7 leads to the failure of 𝑃8 since it 
is connected to 𝑃7 only. As the result, the communication 
entities in the substation of bus 𝑃8 (substation 10 or 𝑆10) also 
fail. Those entities are: 𝑆10 server denoted as (𝐶1,1,10,10) and 
𝑆10 gateway denoted as (𝐶1,2,10,10). The 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀6  or (𝐶2,1,6,0) 
is connected to 𝑆10 only, therefore it also fails. The simulation 
results also prove this. After the failure of 𝑃7, 𝑆10 got islanded 
from the rest of the network; since all entities of that substation 
do not contribute to the smart grid anymore, they can be 
considered as non-operational. This observation can propose 
a theory that if the smart grid system is considered as a two 
layered graph, then the vertices in the power layer that are 
connected to some pendant vertices are the most critical for 
𝐾 = 1. However, if the IIM IDRs are used, the failure of any 
one of the following entities: 
{
{𝐶1,1,6,6}, {𝐶1,2,6,6}, {𝐶1,1,7,7}, {𝐶1,2,7,7}, {𝐶1,1,8,8}, {𝐶1,2,8,8},
{𝐶1,1,9,9}, {𝐶1,2,9,9}, {𝐶1,1,11,11}, {𝐶1,2,11,11}
} 
will lead to the failure of 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀1 and therefore all entities 
connected to 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀1 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶2,1,1,0) will fail. This again will 
lead to the failure of 𝑂𝐴𝐷𝑀1, 𝑂𝐴𝐷𝑀4 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑂𝐴𝐷𝑀5. Also, 
due to the failure of 𝑂𝐴𝐷𝑀1 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶3,1,1,0), communication 
entities of 𝑆10 also fail, leading to the failure of 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀6. The 
cascade of failure is shown below assuming substation server 
6 or (𝐶1,1,6,6) failed initially: 
{𝐶1,1,6,6} → {𝐶1,2,6,6} → {𝐶2,1,1,0}
→ {{𝐶1,2,7,7}, {𝐶1,2,8,8}, {𝐶1,2,9,9}, {𝐶1,2,11,11}}
→ {{𝐶1,1,7,7}, {𝐶1,1,8,8}, {𝐶1,1,9,9}, {𝐶1,1,11,11}}
→ {{𝐶3,1,1,0}, {𝐶3,1,4,0}, {𝐶3,1,5,0}} → {𝐶1,2,10,10} → {𝐶1,1,10,10} 
Therefore, a total of 16 entities are damaged. This 
prediction does not match with the simulation results. 
For, 𝐾 = 2, according to the MIIM IDRs, the failure of 
both the control center servers or failure of both control center 
gateways can result in the maximum damage i.e. all 34 
communication entities will fail. However, this situation is 
absurd. Moreover, the main control center is already hardened 
by means of the backup control center. Analyzing the effect of 
failure of the backup entities as well (that also in the first step), 
is beyond the scope of this work and also it is hypothetical. 
Therefore, we are considering the maximum damage caused 
by the next 2-most critical entities in the network. The 
following pairs of entities are most critical if MIIM IDRs are 
used: 
{
{𝑃1, 𝑃7}, {𝑃2, 𝑃4}, {𝑃2, 𝑃5}, {𝑃2, 𝑃7}, {𝑃3, 𝑃7}, {𝐶1,1,2,2, 𝑃7},
{𝑃7, 𝑃10}, {𝑃7, 𝑃13}, {𝐶1,2,2,2, 𝑃7}
} 
The failure of any of the above pairs can lead to the failure 
of a total of 9 entities in the network. The simulation results 
also validate this prediction. The cascading failure of entities 
after the initial failure of each of the above (𝐾 = 2) sets is 
shown below: 
𝑆𝑒𝑡 1: {𝑃1, 𝑃7} → {𝑃1, 𝑃7, 𝑃8}
→ {{𝐶1,2,3,3}, {𝐶1,1,3,3}, {𝐶1,2,10,10}, {𝐶1,1,10,10}}
→ {{𝐶2,1,3,0}, {𝐶2,1,6,0}} = 9 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
𝑆𝑒𝑡 2: {𝑃2, 𝑃4} → {𝑃2, 𝑃4, 𝑃3}
→ { {𝐶1,2,4,4} , {𝐶1,1,4,4}, {𝐶1,2,5,5}, {𝐶1,1,5,5} }
→ {{𝐶2,1,4,0}, {𝐶2,1,5,0}} = 9 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
𝑆𝑒𝑡 3: {𝑃2, 𝑃5} → {𝑃2, 𝑃5, 𝑃1}
→ { {𝐶1,2,4,4} , {𝐶1,1,4,4}, {𝐶1,2,3,3}, {𝐶1,1,3,3} }
→ {{𝐶2,1,3,0}, {𝐶2,1,4,0}} = 9 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
𝑆𝑒𝑡 4: {𝑃2, 𝑃7} → {𝑃2, 𝑃7, 𝑃8}
→ {{𝐶1,2,4,4}, {𝐶1,1,4,4}, {𝐶1,2,10,10}, {𝐶1,1,10,10}}
→ {{𝐶2,1,4,0}, {𝐶2,1,6,0}} = 9 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
𝑆𝑒𝑡 5: {𝑃3, 𝑃7} → {𝑃3, 𝑃7, 𝑃8}
→ {{𝐶1,2,5,5}, {𝐶1,1,5,5}, {𝐶1,2,10,10}, {𝐶1,1,10,10}}
→ {{𝐶2,1,5,0}, {𝐶2,1,6,0}} = 9 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
𝑆𝑒𝑡 6: {𝐶1,1,2,2, 𝑃7} → { {𝐶1,1,2,2} , {𝑃7} , {𝐶1,2,2,2} , {𝑃8} }
→ {{𝐶1,2,10,10}, {𝐶1,1,10,10}}
→ {{𝐶2,1,2,0}, {𝐶2,1,6,0}, {𝐶3,1,2,0}}
= 9 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
𝑆𝑒𝑡 7: {𝑃7, 𝑃10} → {𝑃7, 𝑃10, 𝑃8}
→ {{𝐶1,2,10,10}, {𝐶1,1,10,10}, {𝐶1,2,11,11}, {𝐶1,1,11,11}}
→ {{𝐶3,1,4,0}, {𝐶2,1,6,0}} = 9 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
𝑆𝑒𝑡 8: {𝑃7, 𝑃13} → {𝑃7, 𝑃13, 𝑃8}
→ {{𝐶1,2,10,10}, {𝐶1,1,10,10}, {𝐶1,2,7,7}, {𝐶1,1,7,7}}
→ {{𝐶3,1,5,0}, {𝐶2,1,6,0}} = 9 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
𝑆𝑒𝑡 9: {𝐶1,2,2,2, 𝑃7} → { {𝐶1,2,2,2} , {𝑃7} , {𝐶1,1,2,2} , {𝑃8} }
→ {{𝐶1,2,10,10}, {𝐶1,1,10,10}}
→ {{𝐶2,1,2,0}, {𝐶2,1,6,0}, {𝐶3,1,2,0}}
= 9 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
When IIM IDRs are used, the following pairs become most 
critical entities: 
{
{𝑃12, 𝑃1}, {𝑃13, 𝑃1}, {𝑃14, 𝑃1}, {𝑃11, 𝑃1}, {𝑃10, 𝑃1}, {𝑃12, 𝑃2},
{𝑃13, 𝑃2}, {𝑃14, 𝑃2}, {𝑃11, 𝑃2}, {𝑃10, 𝑃2}, {𝑃12, 𝑃3}, {𝑃13, 𝑃3},
{𝑃14, 𝑃3}, {𝑃11, 𝑃3}, {𝑃10, 𝑃3}
} 
For each of the above pairs, the total damage will be: 36 
entities. Considering the first (𝐾 = 2) set, the cascade will be: 
{𝑃12, 𝑃1} → {𝐶1,2,6,6, 𝐶1,2,3,3}  → {𝐶1,1,6,6, 𝐶1,1,3,3}
→ {𝐶2,1,1,0, 𝐶2,1,3,0, 𝐶3,1,3,0}
→ {𝐶1,2,7,7, 𝐶1,2,8,8, 𝐶1,2,9,9, 𝐶1,2,11,11, 𝐶1,2,4,4, 𝐶1,2,5,5}
→ {𝐶1,1,7,7, 𝐶1,1,8,8, 𝐶1,1,9,9, 𝐶1,1,11,11, 𝐶1,1,4,4, 𝐶1,1,5,5}
→ {𝐶2,1,4,0, 𝐶2,1,5,0, 𝐶3,1,1,0, 𝐶3,1,4,0, 𝐶3,1,5,0}
→ {𝐶1,2,10,10, 𝐶1,1,10,10, 𝐶3,1,2,0, 𝐶1,2,1,1, 𝐶1,1,1,1} → {𝐶2,1,6,0}
→ {𝐶2,1,2,0} → 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝐶𝑇 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 
In the similar way, prediction of MIIM based ILP solution 
is accurate in case of 𝐾 = 3, 4 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5 but the prediction of IIM 
based solution is very different from the simulation results. It 
is observed that from 𝐾 = 4 to 𝐾 = 5, there is a sudden huge 
change in the total number of failed entities for both MIIM 
based solution and simulation result. This happens due to the 
only set of 𝐾 = 5, {𝑃4, 𝑃7, 𝑃9, 𝑃5, 𝑃6} that leads to total 
communication failure in both the situations and as a result, 
the maximum total number of failed entities suddenly change 
from 20 (𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐾 = 4) to 40 (𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐾 = 5). The cascade of 
failure is shown below: 
{𝑃4, 𝑃7, 𝑃9, 𝑃5, 𝑃6}
→ {{𝐶1,1,1,1}, {𝐶1,2,1,1}, {𝐶1,1,2,2}, {𝐶1,2,2,2}, {𝑃8}} 
which means both the control center servers and gateways 
are failing leading to total communication network failure. 
Therefore, total entities failed = (initial 5 buses + P8 + 34 
communication entities) = 40. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
Using a dual platform based simulation of the smart grid 
system to verify the interdependency model MIIM is a novel 
approach proposed in this paper. Since, the MIIM ILP based 
solution is verified here using this co-simulation, the K-most 
vulnerable entities for any huge smart grid system can be 
easily obtained in a short time by using the ILP based solution 
considering the MIIM IDRs. Therefore, this approach can be 
used in real smart grids to obtain a self-updating K-
Contingency list just by updating IDRs after any failure in the 
system. A scope of future work can be finding a method to use 
the PMU data that is sent to the control centers at the rate of 
30 samples per second to update the MIIM IDRs and 
automatically update the K-most vulnerable entities each time 
a new failure takes place in the system. Computing the ILP 
based contingency list within a very short period of time can 
be challenging and thus a suitable heuristic solution that takes 
into account all the observations of the simulation can also be 
a scope of future work. 
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